Determinants of foreign direct investment in fast-growing economies: evidence from the BRICS and MINT countries by Asongu, Simplice et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
Determinants of foreign direct investment
in fast-growing economies: evidence from
the BRICS and MINT countries
Simplice Asongu1,2*, Uduak S. Akpan3 and Salisu R. Isihak4
* Correspondence: asongusimplice@
yahoo.com
1Department of Economics,
University of South Africa, UNISA, P.
O. Box 392, Pretoria 0003, South
Africa
2Department of Economics &
Development Studies, Covenant
University, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
The flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into a country can benefit both the investing
entity and host government. This study employed panel analysis to examine the factors
that determine the direction of FDI to the fast-growing BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey) countries. First, we
used a pooled time-series cross sectional analysis of data from 2001 to 2011 to estimate
and model the determinants of FDI for three samples: BRICS only, MINT only, and BRICS
and MINT combined. Then, a fixed effects approach was employed to provide the model
for BRICS and MINT combined. The results demonstrate that market size, infrastructure
availability, and trade openness play the most significant roles in attracting FDI to BRICS
and MINT, while the roles of availability of natural resources and institutional quality are
insignificant. To sustain and promote FDI inflow, the governments of BRICS and MINT
must ensure that their countries remain attractive for investment by offering a level
playing field for investors and political stability. BRICS and MINT governments also need
to invest more in their human capital to ensure that their economies can absorb substantial
skills and technology spillovers from FDI and promote sustainable long-term economic
growth. This study is significant because it contributes to the literature on determinants of
FDI by extending the scope of previous studies that often focused on BRICS only.
Keywords: FDI, Determinants, Fast-growing economies, BRICS, MINT
Introduction
Investment—whether public or private, domestic or foreign—is crucial to the socio-economic
transformation of any economy. In the 1970s and 1980s, many developing countries imposed
trade restrictions and capital controls designed to protect domestic industries from the domi-
neering influence of their foreign counterparts and to conserve foreign exchange reserves (de
Mello 1997; Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006). These policies resulted in a distortion of social
and private return on capital that reduced foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into their re-
spective countries (de Mello 1997) and impaired economic growth (Rodrik 1998). In the late
1980s and early 1990s, many Latin American countries responded to the challenges of eco-
nomic development facing them by initiating reforms that removed restrictions on trade and
FDI. These policy changes resulted in impressive economic growth by the countries in the re-
gion (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, UNESCAP
2000). Faced with shortages in domestic resources needed to finance growth, many
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developing countries began to look abroad for financial backing, and established policies to
attract FDI (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD 2013; Asongu
2013a, 2014).
FDI in developing countries has the potential to be beneficial for both the host countries
and the multi-national corporations (MNCs) or other entities seeking to invest. For the host
countries, FDI provides additional financial resources through investment and by paying
taxes. Foreign investment also creates employment and generates spill-over effects, such as
transfer of skills and technology, managerial expertise, and corporate governance practices.
At the same time, the MNCs gain access to markets, site-specific natural resources,
low-cost manpower, and opportunities to exploit the advantages of bilateral and multilateral
trade policies. According to the “2013 World Investment Report” published by the
UNCTAD, developing countries have been receiving increasingly greater amounts of FDI,
accounting for 52% of global FDI inflows in 2012. Fast-growing economies, such as Brazil,
India, and China, were among the top 20 FDI recipients (UNCTAD 2013). In 2012, the
highest amounts of FDI were received by Mexico in Central America, Indonesia in South-
east Asia, Nigeria in Africa, Turkey in West Asia, Brazil in South America, India in South
Asia, and China in East Asia (World Bank 2013). Incidentally, these countries form the
MINTand BRICS (including Russia and South Africa) countries.
BRICS is an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, a cooperative
association of five major emerging or newly industrialized countries, each distinguished by a
fast-growing middle class and significant influence in the regional and global economy. In
2011, the BRICS countries attracted 26% of the global FDI, contributed 15% of global GDP,
and accounted for 42% of the global population (World Bank 2013). MINT is another group
of fast-growing developing countries comprised of Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey.
The MINT countries share a number of common features. First, they have relatively large,
youthful, and growing populations as compared to the ageing and shrinking populations of
many developed countries and China. Second, they are geographically well placed to take ad-
vantage of large nearby markets, with Indonesia located close to China, Turkey being contigu-
ous to the European Union, Mexico on America’s doorstep, and Nigeria with the potential to
serve as the economic hub of Africa. Of the four MINT countries, only Nigeria is not already
a member of the G20 group of developed and developing countries, but it has a huge wealth
of natural resources, especially oil and gas.
BRICS and MINT have substantive policies to promote the flow of FDI into their respective
countries, especially to sectors that have significant multiplier effects with regard to employ-
ment and output, promotion of technology transfer, and local innovation—albeit restrictions
exist in sectors considered to be strategic for national security (U.S. Department of State
2013). Between 2001 and 2012, the FDI in BRICS and MINT increased by 349%, from
US$113.6 billion to US$510.4 billion (World Bank 2013). Moreover, BRICS and MINT com-
bined attracted 30% of the global FDI, contributed 19% to the global GDP, and accounted for
51% of the global population in 2011 (World Bank 2013). Other significant statistics regarding
BRICS and MINTare presented in Table 1.
This study intends to answer the question, “What are the determinants that attract FDI to
BRICS and MINT countries?” Given the expanding roles played by BRICS and MINT in re-
shaping the global economy, and their status as destinations of choice for FDI sent to emer-
ging economies, our empirical examination of the factors that attract FDI to these countries
can provide important insights.
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This research is significant because it contributes to the literature regarding the determi-
nants of FDI by extending the scope of previous studies, many of which focused on BRICS
only, such as Jadhav (2012), Jadhav and Katti (2012), and Vijayakumar et al. (2010). We exam-
ine whether the determinants of FDI in BRICS are the same as for MINT. The results of this
work can provide policy direction for other fast-growing developing countries that would like
to attract FDI. This paper also complements recent literature that has focused on factors de-
termining investment in developing countries, including Bartels et al. (2009), Tuomi (2011),
Kolstad and Wiig (2011), Darley (2012), Asongu (2012, 2013b, 2013c, 2015), Ajide and
Raheem (2016), Xiong et al. (2015), Safaee and Geray (2017), and Pautwoe and Piabuo (2017).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section “Background and Related Lit-
erature” presents the theoretical basis for this research along with a review of the literature on
FDI. Section “Methodology” describes the methodology employed by this study, while Section
“Results and Discussions” delivers the results and a discussion. Our concluding remarks are
given in Section “Conclusion”, including suggestions for the direction of future work.
Background and related literature
Theories of FDI
The existing literature distinguishes between three types of theories concerning the relation-
ship of FDI to economic development: the dependency theory, classical theory, and middle
path theory (Toone 2013; Gammoudi et al. 2016). The dependency theory builds on a Marxist
foundation that perceives globalization through the prism of exploitation of cheap labor,
expansion of market capitalism, and exchange of primary resources in return for obsolete
technological know-how from more developed countries. Advocates of the dependency theory
hold that the potentially negative influence of FDI on development outcomes in less developed
countries can be substantiated as follows. (i) The rewards of FDI are not equitably distributed
between host countries and multi-national corporations (MNCs) because the latter get the
lion’s share of the various benefits. Moreover, by exploiting profit-making avenues in less
developed countries and sending the profits to their rich home nations, foreign investors
crowd out local assets that would otherwise have been utilized to fund local development
(Jensen 2008). (ii) MNCs also create instability in domestic economies by distorting domestic
investment. MNCs use capital-intensive technologies that increase unemployment, increase
income-inequality, and change the tastes of customers by undermining local values (Taylor
and Thrift 2013). (iii) Often, the citizens of the under-developed host countries are excluded
from reaping the fruits of FDI because of alliances between the local politico-economic elite
and foreign investors (Jensen 2008).
In contrast, proponents of the classical theory maintain that FDI can be beneficial to the do-
mestic economies of less developed countries through a number of mechanisms: improve-
ment in the balance of payments; transfer of capital, skills, and advanced technologies; growth
of foreign exchange earnings; expansion of the tax base resulting from exports related to FDI;
integration of the domestic economy into international markets; and development of domestic
infrastructure (Toone 2013). The literature on FDI spillovers, which has been documented
substantially, provides insight that spillover effects take many forms, including better
working methods, good management skills, more employment, domestic financial devel-
opment, and higher productivity gains (Javorcik 2004; Asongu and De Moor 2017).
The “middle path” theory is a combination of the two preceding theoretical approaches. In
essence, the middle path is a cautious theory that focuses on the development consequences
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of foreign direct investment. Dependency theory focuses on the obvious negative effects from
FDI, while classical theory points out the rewards, especially if initial conditions needed for
the benefits of FDI are satisfied by the developing domestic economies (Asongu 2017a; Gam-
moudi et al. 2016). Proponents of the middle path seek the convergence of these theories by
emphasizing the importance of a mixture of regulation (i.e., intervention) and openness. This
combined approach addresses both the cautions presented by dependency theory that require
heavy government intervention and regulation, and the rewards described by classical theory’s
advocacy of openness. In a nutshell, according to the middle path, the goal of the domestic
economy is to attract FDI while adopting policies that reduce the negative effects of FDI.
There are fundamental determinants of FDI that are acknowledged by all of the versions of
the contending theories, notably policy indicators (e.g., tax, trade, privatization, and macroeco-
nomic policies), business dynamics (e.g., incentives for investment), market-related factors
(e.g., market structure, market growth, and market size), resource-oriented determinants (e.g.,
technology availability, labor costs, and raw materials), and drivers toward economic efficiency
(e.g., labor productivity, and transportation and communication costs). Our study builds on
these common denominators to assess FDI determinants in the fast-growing economies in
the BRICS and MINT countries. This approach allows us to examine the motivations of
MNCs when deciding to adopt locations for their FDI efforts.
Over the years, the motivations of multi-national enterprises for engaging in FDI have been
rationalized from several theoretical viewpoints, including neoclassical trade theory, market
imperfections, product lifecycle theory, and eclectic paradigms. Neoclassical trade theory
builds on the Heskscher-Ohlin model, which asserts that trade opportunities and capital flows
between two countries depend on the relative endowment of factors of production. The impli-
cation is that multi-national enterprises invest in countries to take advantage of higher returns
on investment or low production costs. In comparison, the market imperfection theory argues
that because markets are imperfect, multi-national enterprises are able to locate their busi-
nesses or production activities in these countries to exploit economies of scale, ownership ad-
vantages, and government incentives (Kindlerberger 1969; Eiteman et al. 2007). Furthermore,
the theory asserts that market imperfections in underdeveloped countries propel
multi-national enterprises to internalize their operations in those host countries as the most
economical means of safeguarding their intangible assets (Buckley and Casson 1976; Hennart
1982; Shapiro 2006).
The product lifecycle theory developed by Vernon (1966) asserts that the lifecycle of a prod-
uct has four stages: introduction, growth, maturity, and decline. Furthermore, lifecycle devel-
opment follows a pattern, whereby new products are introduced first in advanced countries
and then diffused over time to developing countries. Therefore, the stages of the product life-
cycle influence the decision of a multi-national enterprise either to export the product or set
up a production facility in the foreign market. The goal of the MNC is to achieve lower pro-
duction costs while catering to the growing demand for its product in both the foreign market
and the home market at a competitive price. Finally, the eclectic paradigm, developed by Dun-
ning (1988, 1993, 2000) is perhaps the most comprehensive theoretical viewpoint for rational-
izing the decisions of multi-national enterprises to engage in FDI. The eclectic paradigm
framework holds that the scope, geography, and industrial components of FDI by
multi-national enterprises are influenced by the interaction of three sets of interdependent var-
iables. These variables are themselves composed of the sub-components of three areas of
focus: strategic advantages in ownership, location specificity, and internalization (OLI).
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Review of related literature
A substantial number of empirical studies have explored the determinants of FDI in develop-
ing countries. Studies that focused on a single country often used time-series analysis, while
multi-country studies often employed panel data analysis (Asiedu 2002; Biswas 2002; Jadhav
2012; and Rogmans & Ebbers, 2013). The choice of dependent as well as explanatory vari-
ables also differed depending on the countries examined. For the dependent variables, studies
used the unidirectional FDI inflow to host countries (Rogmans & Ebbers, 2013), net FDI
inflow (Jadhav 2012), ratio of FDI inflow to GDP (Suliman and Mollick 2009; Lehnert et al.
2013), and ratio of net FDI flows to GDP (Asiedu 2002). The choice of explanatory variables
varied as well, although some variables have been used consistently. For instance, market size
(often represented by real GDP or real GDP per capita) was employed by many empirical
studies (Cheng and Kwan 2000; Moosa and Cardak 2006) because it captures the demand
for goods and services in the host country. Other explanatory variables often used include
the level of trade openness, growth rate, an indicator for infrastructure availability, inflation,
and availability of natural resources, as well as indicators that capture political risk and insti-
tutional strength (Asiedu 2002; Moosa 2002; Moosa and Cardak 2006; Jadhav 2012; Sichei
and Kinyondo 2012; Rogmans & Ebbers, 2013). UNCTAD (2002) classifies these variables
into the five major groups shown in Table 2. Nontraditional variables such as type of regime
in the host country (e.g., democracy, autocracy, monarchy), regime duration, and risk of
expropriation of private investment have also been used in some studies (Biswas 2002).
Jadhav (2012) explored the role of economic, institutional, and political factors in attract-
ing FDI to BRICS economies using panel data for the ten-year period 2000–2009. The find-
ings of the study indicated that the market size, openness to trade, and rule of law played
significant roles in attracting FDI to BRICS, while natural resource availability had a negative
impact, implying that FDI in BRICS is largely market-oriented. Jadhav and Katti (2012) ob-
served that effective governance and regulatory quality had a positive impact on FDI inflow
in BRICS, while political instability, voice and accountability, and control of corruption had
negative effects. Similarly, using data from 1975 to 2007, Vijayakumar et al. (2010) employed
panel analysis to examine the determinants that bring FDI to BRICS. They observed that
market size, labor cost, infrastructure, and gross capital formation contributed positively to
FDI inflow, while the effects of trade openness and inflation were insignificant.
Asiedu (2002) examined the determinants of FDI in developing countries with special
focus on Africa. Building on the observation that developing countries in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) attracted very little FDI in the 1990s despite economic reforms, the study
sought to understand whether the determinants of FDI in developing countries in other
regions were different from those in SSA. They employed panel data for 71 developing
countries for the years 1988–1997. The results showed that low infrastructure development
Table 2 UNCTAD’s Classification of FDI determinants
Determining Variables Examples
Policy variables Tax policy, trade policy, privatization policy,
macroeconomic policy
Business variables Investment incentives
Market-related economic determinants Market size, market growth, market structure
Resource-related economic determinants Raw materials, labor cost, technology
Efficiency-related economic determinants Transport and communication costs, labor productivity
Source: UNCTAD (2002)
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and low return on capital, as well as the unfavorable geographic location of many SSA
countries, were responsible for the limited FDI inflow. Similarly, Asiedu (2005) examined
the role of natural resources, market size, government policy, institutions, and political
instability in attracting FDI to countries in SSA.
Rogmans and Ebbers (2013) examined the determinants of FDI in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region using panel data from 1987 to 2008. They observed that natural
resources endowment contributed negatively to FDI inflows while trade openness had a posi-
tive effect. The study suggested that the negative contribution of natural resource endowment
to FDI resulted because countries that are highly endowed are more likely to have protection-
ist policies, thereby limiting potential FDI from resource-seeking MNCs. Hayakawa et al.
(2013) investigated the effects of various components of political and financial risk on FDI in-
flow using panel data for 89 developing countries for the period 1985–2007. They observed
that internal conflict, military politics, corruption, and bureaucracy influenced FDI flow nega-
tively, while lower financial risk had no significant impact. Cleeve (2012) used panel data to
examine the role of several institutional factors and political stability in attracting FDI to 40
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to institutional variables included in many other
previous studies, Cleeve’s study considered ethnic tensions, religious tensions, and disaggre-
gated conflicts when examining internal and external factors.
A summary of results from earlier studies that examined the determinants of FDI can be
found in Asiedu (2002), Moosa (2002), and Moosa and Cardak (2006). Other studies that ex-
plored the determinants of FDI include Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis (2007), Ranjan
and Agrawal (2011), and Buchanan et al. (2012). Rjoub et al. (2017a) investigated the impact
of FDI inflows on economic growth in landlocked countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to establish
a positive nexus between the two variables. Rjoub et al. (2016) assessed the connection be-
tween FDI and economic growth in Latin American countries to document that economic
growth is affected positively by FDI inflows.
Methodology
Data and variables
Following the practice of previous studies, this paper adopted a panel analysis procedure to
examine data for the eleven-year period 2001–2011. The sample was limited to BRICS and
MINT countries because they were recognized as fast-growing emerging economies at the
time of the study. The periodicity also was 2001–2011 because of data availability constraints
at the time of the study. Appendix 1 reports improvements of GDP per capita with manu-
facturing and industrial activities in the MINT and BRICS countries for almost the same
periodicity (Asongu and Odhiambo 2018). As apparent from the table, the highest GDP
growth per capita occurred in China, India, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Turkey while the
highest increase per year during the corresponding time period occurred, in increasing
order, in India, South Africa, Brazil, China, and Turkey.
The choice of variables used in our model was influenced by previous studies as well.
For the dependent variable, we used the net FDI inflow (Jadhav 2012) expressed in billion
US$, as denoted by NetFDI. This value was log-normalized to enable comparability with
other variables. As noted by UNCTAD (2002), determinants of FDI may be
market-related, resource-related, efficiency-related, or related to sound economic and/or
political policies. In addition, indicators for institutional and governance quality were used
as explanatory variables (Jadhav 2012, Jadhav and Katti 2012; and others) because they
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impact investment risk in fast-growing economies, which in turn affects the attractiveness
of the country for FDI. In summary, our explanatory variables are shown below.
(1) GDP: The gross domestic product given in terms of constant 2005 U.S. dollars (in
billions)—used as a proxy for market size, i.e., GDP is a market-related economic
determinant.
(2) NResGDP: The share of natural resources in GDP expressed in percentages—used
as a proxy for resource-related economic determinants.
(3) Infrastructure: An indicator of the level of infrastructure availability, expressed in terms of
the number of mobile phones per 100 persons (Asiedu 2002; Sekkat and Veganzones-
Varoudakis 2007)—used as a proxy for efficiency-related economic determinants.
(4) Inflation: The inflation rate (consumer price index) of a country—used as a proxy
for macro-economic stability.
(5) Trade: Representing openness to trade i.e., the ratio of total trade (exports + imports)
to GDP—used as a policy variable.
Data used in the study were obtained from the World Bank’s databases for world
development indicators and world governance indicators.
Principal component analysis of governance and institutional indicators
The indicators for institutional and governance quality capture different broad dimensions
of the character of institutions and administration of a country. This approach implies that
including all of the indicators as explanatory variables in a model has the potential to in-
crease the model’s explanatory powers. However, because these variables capture different
dimensions of governance, there is a strong likelihood that they would be highly correlated.
Consequently, a model that includes all the indictors would likely suffer from multicolli-
nearity. The matrix of pair-wise correlation coefficients of the variables as shown in Table 3
confirms this suspicion, demonstrating that the correlations between all pairs of indicators
are significant. Moreover, including all the variables could lead to over-parameterization of
the model, which would affect the reliability of the model. Therefore, this study used princi-
pal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimension of the variables.
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical technique applied to reduce the dimen-
sionality of a larger set of possibly correlated variables into a smaller set of linearly uncorre-
lated variables called principal components. The first principal component accounts for the
largest possible variance from the original data set, and each successive principal component
accounts for a variance smaller than that of the preceding principal component (Jolliffe 2002).
We employed Eviews to calculate the PCA for the governance and institutional indicators
using ordinary correlations. The summary of our results presented in Table 4 shows that the
first eigenvalue encompassed up to 75% of the information on institutional and governance in-
dicators. Therefore, the corresponding eigen vector (i.e., the eigenvector for PC 1) was selected
to compute the principal component from the institutional and governance indicators. A
correlation matrix involving all of the variables is provided in Appendix 3.
Model specification
We specify our model as follows:
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NetFDIit ¼ β0 þ β1GDPit þ β2N ResGDPit þ β3Infrastructureit þ β4Inflationit
þβ5Tradeit þ β6InstIndexit þ εit
ð1Þ
where i represents the i th country, and t represents the year.
We expected, a priori, that the coefficient of the GDP would be positive since market
size was anticipated to have a positive influence on FDI inflow. Although natural re-
sources availability in developing countries can attract resource-seeking FDI, previous
studies have argued that resource-seeking FDI in resource-rich developing countries
depends on existing investment policies and market orientation (Rogmans & Ebbers,
2013). In some studies, the availability of natural resources contributed positively to
FDI (Asiedu 2005; Sichei and Kinyondo 2012), while in others, it contributed negatively
(Jadhav 2012; Rogmans & Ebbers, 2013). Therefore, the expected sign of the coefficient
of NResGDP was not certain.
The availability of good infrastructure reduces transaction costs. Therefore, we anticipated
that the coefficient of Infrastructure would be positive. The coefficient of Trade was expected
to be positive because countries that are more open to trade tend to attract market-seeking
FDI, while the coefficient of Inflation was predicted to be negative because a low and stable
inflation rate reduces the macroeconomic risks associated with investment and makes the
host country more attractive to FDI. Furthermore, high political risks and inefficient institu-
tions generally discourage FDI (Asiedu 2005; Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006), so InstIndex
was expected to have a positive coefficient. The analysis was done using Eviews.
Table 3 Matrix of pair-wise correlation coefficients for institutional and governance indicators
Legend Indicators V.A. P.S. G.E. R.Q. R.L. C.C.
Correlation V.A. 1
t-Statistic –
Probability –
P.S. 0.3294 1
3.4364 –
0.0009 –
G.E. 0.4571 0.7597 1
5.0613 11.5077 –
0.0000 0.0000 –
R.Q. 0.5429 0.7742 0.8836 1
6.3675 12.0485 18.5806 –
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 –
R.L. 0.5386 0.5793 0.8279 0.7166 1
6.2964 7.0005 14.5361 10.1199 –
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 –
C.C. 0.6329 0.7521 0.8618 0.8868 0.8189 1
8.0509 11.2397 16.7292 18.9009 14.0510 –
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 –
VA Voice and Accountability, PS Political Stability, GE Governance Effectiveness, RQ Regulatory Quality, RL Rule of Law, CC
Control of corruption
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Results and discussions
We present the descriptive statistics for BRICS and MINT in Table 5. We observe from
Table 5 that the net FDI inflow to BRICS between 2001 and 2011 ranged from US$-0.18 bil-
lion to US$280.07 billion, with an average of US$43.15 billion and a standard deviation of
US$58.05 billion. Similarly, the maximum and minimum GDP were US$4194.94 billion and
US$210.30 billion, respectively, while the mean and standard deviation were US$1119.96
billion and US$922.76 billion, respectively. For the institutional index, the maximum and
minimum values were 1.71 and − 2.12, respectively, while the mean and standard deviation
were − 0.11 and 0.82, respectively. However, the maximum and minimum net FDI inflows
to MINT for the years under consideration were US31.38 billion and US$-2.98 billion, re-
spectively, with a mean of US$11.26 billion and standard deviation of US$9.41 billion. The
Institutional index for MINT ranged from − 3.08 to 0.13, with a mean of − 1.20 and stand-
ard deviation of 1.12. Table 6 provides the full summary of the statistics for the BRICS and
MINTcountries, including the units of measurement.
To examine whether the determinants of FDI in BRICS are different from those of MINT,
we employed the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) pooled time-series cross-sectional technique
to calculate Eq. (1) for three subsamples: BRICS only, MINT only, and BRICS and MINT
combined. Pooled analysis was preferred over panel analysis for the BRICS only and MINT
only subsamples because panel analysis would involve testing whether the model follows a
Table 4 Result of principal component analysis showing eigen values and eigen vectors
Eigen Eigen Vectors (loadings)
Number Eigen
Value
Proportion Comulative
Proportion
Variable PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6
1 4.5148 0.7525 0.7525 V.A. 0.3053 0.8482 0.3365 0.1214 0.2422 −0.0253
2 0.7316 0.1219 0.8744 P.S. 0.3848 −0.4612 0.5319 0.5811 0.1086 0.0829
3 0.3855 0.0643 0.9386 G.E. 0.4405 − 0.2075 − 0.2397 − 0.2685 0.524 − 0.5424
4 0.1929 0.0322 0.9708 R.Q. 0.4400 −0.1153 0.1925 − 0.6364 − 0.0374 0.5913
5 0.1072 0.0179 0.9887 R.L. 0.4089 0.0956 −0.7136 0.4078 −0.0231 0.3841
6 0.0680 0.0113 1 C.C. 0.4516 0.0477 0.0117 −0.0645 −0.7671 − 0.4484
VA Voice and Accountability, PS Political Stability, GE Governance Effectiveness, RQ Regulatory Quality, RL Rule of Law, CC
Control of corruption
Table 5 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis
NetFDI GDP Infrastructure NResGDP Inflation Trade InstIndex
BRICS
Maximum 280.07 4194.94 179.31 38.41 21.46 0.71 1.71
Minimum −0.18 210.30 0.61 3.01 −0.77 0.23 −2.12
Mean 43.15 1119.96 57.43 10.76 6.77 0.48 −0.11
Median 22.46 882.19 46.35 6.32 5.86 0.51 −0.08
Std. Dev. 58.05 922.76 44.94 9.74 4.34 0.14 0.82
MINT
Maximum 31.38 995.03 102.49 17.22 54.40 0.86 0.13
Minimum −2.98 70.84 0.21 0.29 3.41 0.38 −3.08
Mean 11.26 451.95 46.18 6.81 10.84 0.56 −1.20
Median 8.61 382.46 43.15 7.52 8.66 0.54 −0.92
Std. Dev. 9.41 294.52 29.96 4.67 9.79 0.10 1.12
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fixed effect model or random effect model, and random effects estimation requires the num-
ber of cross sections to be greater than the number of coefficients. The results of the pooled
analysis are presented in Table 6.
Table 6 demonstrates that GDP was a significant determinant of FDI in both BRICS and
MINTcountries. The coefficient of NResGDP was positive and insignificant in the subsample
of BRICS only, but negative and insignificant in the subsample of MINT only. The coefficient
of infrastructure was positive and significant in BRICS, but not significant in MINT. For In-
flation, the coefficient was negative in MINT as expected, although insignificant but positive
in BRICS. The coefficient of Trade was negative and insignificant in BRICS, but positive and
significant in MINT, while the coefficient of InstIndex was positive and significant in BRICS
as expected, but negative in MINT. Thus, we observe that depending on the set of countries
considered, the determinants of FDI in fast-growing developing economies differed. For the
combined sample of MINT and BRICS as estimated using OLS, the signs of the coefficients
of GDP, Infrastructure, and Trade were in line with our a priori expectations and were signifi-
cant, suggesting that these are the main determinants of FDI in BRICS and MINT.
We went further to ascertain the appropriate specification (i.e., fixed-effect or
random-effect) to use in estimating the model for the combined sample of BRICS and
MINT. We carried out the Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978) under the null hy-
pothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model
(i.e., estimates from the random-effect model are consistent and efficient). The p-values
(0.0000) of the chi-square value (35.06) from the Hausman specification test for
cross-section random effect were less than 0.05, indicating that the null hypothesis can be
rejected. Consequently, the fixed effect model specification was employed to estimate the
panel model. A summary of the results is presented in Table 7.
Consistent with recent literature, the fixed effects model was adopted to control for
country-specific features or unobserved heterogeneity, which is related to endogeneity. Fur-
thermore, according to Asongu (2016) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2018), when a panel
consists of observations of fixed and comparatively small sets of cross section units (e.g.,
member states of a given region), there is a presumption in favor of FE.
We observe from Table 7 that the coefficient of GDP was positive as expected and signifi-
cant, indicating that market size was an important determinant of FDI inflows to BRICS
and MINT. This finding implies that, ceteris paribus, if the GDP of BRICS and MINT were
to increase by US$1 billion, on average, the amount of FDI directed into the countries
would increase by US$56 million. The sign of NResGDP was negative but insignificant, in-
dicating that BRICS and MINT countries that are less dependent on natural resources are
Table 6 Summary Statistics of 9 countries for the period 2001–2011: 99 observations
Mean S.D. Min Max Units
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (NFDI) 28.979 46.359 −2.977 280.07 Current (Log)
Log of real GDP (constant of 2005 US billions) 6.346 0.886 4.260 8.341 Real (Log)
Infrastructure (Number of mobile phones per 100 people) 52.433 39.220 0.210 179.31 Per heads
Naturals resources (on GDp) 9.003 8.110 0.294 38.410 Share GDP
Inflation (Consumer Price Index, annual %) 8.580 7.519 −0.765 54.400 Rate of growth
Trade Openness (Import + Exports on GDP) 0.514 0.128 0.225 0.856 Share GDP
Units of measurement: Current value of NFDI is in Billions USD. Shares of GDP are expressed in percentages of GDP.
Rates of growth are the percentage of annual increase
SD Standard Deviation, Min Minimum, Max Maximum
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likely to receive more FDI. This result also suggests that FDI flows into BRICS and MINT
are not resource-oriented but market-oriented. The sign of the coefficient of Infrastructure
was in line with a priori expectations and was significant. This finding suggests that for
every unit increase in the number of mobile phones users per 100 persons in BRICS and
MINT, on average, FDI inflow to the countries will increase by $US156 million, all other
things being equal. This result further emphasizes the importance of infrastructure in redu-
cing the cost of transacting business in a country, thereby encouraging investment.
The study expected the coefficient of Inflation to be negative, but the result yielded a posi-
tive and insignificant coefficient. One possible explanation is that BRICS and MINT coun-
tries that have higher inflation rates tend to attract more FDI. A more plausible
interpretation is that macro-economic stability in BRICS and MINT tends to play a lesser
role in investment decisions by multi-national corporations. The coefficient of Trade was
positive as expected and significant, indicating that countries that are more open to trade
are more likely to attract greater amounts of FDI. The coefficient of the InstIndex was par-
tially negative. This finding suggests from an institutional perspective that MNCs are more
likely to invest in BRICS than MINTcountries.
Conclusion
The roles of BRICS and MINT countries in reshaping the global economic environment
should not be underestimated. In 2011, BRICS and MINT together accounted for 51% of the
global population, attracted 30% of global FDI, and contributed 19% of global GDP. Based on
these facts, this study set out to examine the factors that determine the flow of FDI to BRICS
and MINT. We observed that market size, infrastructure availability, and trade openness play
the most significant roles in attracting FDI to these countries, while natural resources availabil-
ity and institutional quality play insignificant roles. Given that FDI inflow to a country has the
potential of being mutually beneficial to the investing entity and host government, the chal-
lenge is to ascertain how BRICS and MINT can sustain their respective levels of FDI inflows
and achieve resulting economic growth and socio-economic transformation.
To sustain the level of FDI inflow, the governments of BRICS and MINT need to ensure
that their countries remain attractive for investment. This implies that in addition to offering
large-scale markets and strategic geographical locations, these countries need to guarantee
Table 7 Fixed effects model result of panel regression analysis
Dependent Variable: NETFDI
Explanatory
Variables
Pooled time-series cross sectional analysis Fixed effects model
BRICS only Mint only BRICS and MINT combined
Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob.
C −44.134 0.000 −12.478 0.081 −47.136 0.000 −44.140 0.000
GDP 0.063 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.056 0.000
NRESGDP 0.150 0.666 −0.388 0.122 −0.132 0.519 −0.200 0.381
INFRASTRUCTURE 0.222 0.000 0.014 0.708 0.134 0.003 0.156 0.042
INFLATION 1.197 0.091 −0.118 0.225 0.389 0.075 0.302 0.198
TRADE −10.028 0.606 25.561 0.023 39.164 0.005 31.942 0.032
INSTINDEX 11.903 0.000 −0.319 0.849 −1.131 0.506 −2.282 0.245
Adjusted R2 0.944 0.779 0.905 0.913
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are used in the estimations (see Rjoub et al. 2017b).
Morever, the Hausman test is used to determine the relevance of the fixed effects model
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that the existing legal framework for investment protects investors and creates a level playing
field for competition in the domestic market. BRICS and MINTgovernments also need to en-
sure political stability in their countries, as stability will reduce investment risk. The govern-
ments of countries with relatively low level or inefficient infrastructures, especially for
transportation and energy (e.g., India and Nigeria) need to invest more in these sectors.
The following recommendations are offered to address the limitations of the current
study. Future research should use other empirical strategies to assess whether the
established relationships can withstand empirical scrutiny from country-specific points
of view. Such country-oriented frameworks are necessary for identifying more targeted
policy implications. Adding human capital to the information set also be worthwhile as
well. Human capital is relevant in economic development because research and educa-
tion have a multitude of direct and indirect positive impacts on real production per
capita as well as on socio-economic welfare. Government quality, the empowerment of
women, and a large number of other indicators can be used for this purpose. The im-
portance of considering human capital is supported by recent international literature
regarding development, including the work of Guisan and Neira (2006), Guisan (2009,
2015), Asongu and Tchamyou (2018), Asongu 2017b), and Tchamyou (2017, 2018).
Appendix 1
The evolution of real value-added per capita of Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing
activities, as well of real Gross Domestic Product per capita of BRICS and MINT
countries for the period 2000–2010. Figure 1 shows the average annual increase of real
production per head for the period 2000–2010.
It is apparent from Appendix 1 that the order of the countries is not the same if
we use the highest positive variations or the highest rates of growth, because for a
same increase a lower initial value implies faster growth (higher rate of growth).
The highest rates of growth of per head corresponded to China, India, Nigeria,
Indonesia and Turkey, but the highest increases, of real GDP per capita, per year
corresponded, in descending order, to Turkey, China, Brazil, South Africa and India
(Asongu and Odhiambo 2018).
Table 8 Production per capita, annual increase and rate of growth (5), 2000–2010
Country
name
QMH
2000
QMH
2010
GDPH
2000
GDPH
2010
QNMH
2000
QNMH
2010
Increase Per
year
Rate ph
Compound
Brazil 1347 1307 7921 10,056 6574 8749 214 2.42
China 852 2181 2664 6816 1812 4635 415 9.85
India 258 430 1718 3073 1460 2643 136 5.99
Indonesia 760 931 2714 3880 1954 2949 117 3.64
Mexico 2414 2239 12,071 12,441 9657 10,202 37 0.30
Nigeria 58 151 1456 2152 1398 2002 70 3.98
Russia 3425 3322 23,108 24,124 19,683 20,803 102 0.43
South
Africa
1421 1137 7480 9477 6059 8340 200 2.39
Turkey 3085 4435 17,959 23,382 14,875 18,948 542 2.67
QMH and QNMH are, respectively, manufacturing and non-manufacturing real value-added per head, while GDPH is the
sum of both variables. Data of QMH, GDPH, QNMH in US Dollars at 2005 Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs). The last col-
umns are the average increase per year and the annual percentage of growth (calculated with compound rate). Source:
Guisan and Aguayo (2015), Guisan and Exposito (2015) and Guisan (2017a, 2017b), elaborated from World Bank indicators
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Appendix 2
These definitions of the indicators of governance and institutional quality are
obtained from the World Governance Indicators database of the World Bank.
(i). Voice and accountability - reflects perceptions of the extent to which
a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government,
as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free
media.
(ii). Political Stability/ No violence - reflects perceptions of the likelihood that
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional
or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and
terrorism.
(iii).Governance effectiveness - reflects perceptions of the quality of
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment
to such policies.
(iv).Regulatory quality - reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and
promote private sector development.
(v). Rule of Law - reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence.
(vi).Control of Corruption - reflects perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms
of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private
interests.
Fig. 1 Increase of real GDP per capita for the period 2000–2010. Source: Elaborated with data of
GDPH from Appendix 1. Countries: 1. Brazil, 2. China, 3. India, 4. Indonesia, 5. Mexico, 6. Nigeria, 7.
Russia, 8. South Africa, 9. Turkey
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Appendix 3
Table 9 Full correlation matrix
Infra Infla Nres VA PS RQ GE RL CC InstIndex NFDI RGDP
1.000 −0
.102
0.277 0.032 0.291 0.291 0.190 0.132 0.141 0.212 0.183 0.198 Infra
1.000 0.077 −0.061 −0.274 −0.124 −
0.254
−0.150 −
0.253
−0.219 −
0.251
−0.339 Infla
1.000 −0.269 −0.228 − 0.261 −0.345 −
0.490
−0.455 − 0.397 0.049 0.066 Nres
1 .000 0.329 0.542 0.457 0.538 0.632 0.648 −0.056 −0.241 VA
1.000 0.774 0.759 0.579 0.752 0.817 0.221 0.450 PS
1.000 0.883 0.716 0.886 0.934 −0.028 0.255 RQ
1.000 0.827 0.861 0.936 0.128 0.393 GE
1.000 0.818 0.868 0.028 0.326 RL
1.000 0.959 −0.067 0.181 CC
1.000 −0.028 0.282 InstIndex
1.000 0.697 NFDI
1.000 RGDP
Infra Infrastructure, Infla Inflation, Nres Natural resources, VA voice & accountability, PS political stability, RQ regulation
quality, GE government effectiveness, RL rule of law, CC Corruption-control, InstIndex Institutional index, NFDI Net Foreign
Direct Investment, RGDP real GDP
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